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THE FORMAL AND INFORMAL SCHEMES
OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM:
A LEGAL SYMBIOSIS EXPLORED
By ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON*
In all law there is, and nothing can avoid it, a conflict as unending as the war
between Heaven and Hell, a war between two principles that may never be recon-
ciled but only compromised. On the one hand there is the principle (said by some
to be a high principle) fiat justitia ruat caelum; on the other hand there is the
pragmatism (said by others to be low and unworthy) interest reipublicae ut sit
finis litium. And so the conflict may not cease, because whilst there are lawsuits
there will be defeated litigants, and whilst there are defeated litigants, the clamour
for the application of the high principle will never be stilled. The low pragmatism
may interest the republic but it interests the defeated litigant not at all. Is this
of Heaven or of Hell?'
I. INTRODUCTION
The civil justice system consists of two different, yet equally important
and complementary components. While the rules of substantive law deter-
mine and establish the conditions and circumstances under which liability
will be imposed, the rules and institutions of procedural law govern the pro-
cess within which civil disputes are resolved in accordance with the substan-
tive law.2 The relationship between the two components is both subtle and
complex. Unfortunately, the tendency has been for Anglo-Canadian jurispru-
dence to draw a hard and fast distinction between procedural and substantive
rules of law. As first glimpsed in the thirteenth century by Balduinus,3 tradi-
tional wisdom declares that whereas substantive rules give rise to legal rights
and obligations, procedural rules simply describe the institutional framework
through which such rights can be protected and enforced. This evaluation is
"artificial and illusory."' 4 The problems of the administration of justice are
inseparable from the problems of what is or ought to be the substance of the
rights being administered. A legal right without an effective machinery to
enforce it is "a brutum fulmen; no law at all." 5
© Copyright, 1981, Allan C. Hutchinson.
* LL.B. (Hons.), LL.M., Barrister of Gray's Inn, Lecturer in the Faculty of Law,
The University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne.
' Russell on Arbitration, ed. Walton (19th ed. London: Stevens & Sons, 1979) at v.
2 The third component of the civil justice system is, of course, the law of evidence.
This serves to determine which facts will be placed before the court in order to decide
whether the circumstances or conditions under which civil liability will attach are met.
For a general theoretical appraisal of the rules of evidence, see Montrose, Basic Con-
cepts of the Law of Evidence (1954), 70 L.Q. Rev. 527 and Eggleston, Evidence, and
Probability (London: Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, 1978) at 1-10.
3 Meijers, L'Histoire des Principes Fondamentaux du Droit International Prive
(1934), 49 Rec. Ac. Dr. Int. 547 at 595.
4 Chamberlayne, 1 Evidence (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1911) at § 171.
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As an integral part of the legal system, the rules and institutions of
procedural law cannot be designed and evaluated in isolation, but must be
considered in relation to the system's overall operation and performance.
Consequently, in very broad and general terms, procedural law must function
in such a way that it results in "the maximization of the execution and effect
given to the substantive branch of the law."0 Although the different proce-
dural schemes and devices adopted to facilitate the resolution of disputes
over legal rights lie at the heart of the Anglo-Canadian legal system, there
is a marked absence of scholarly literature about the conceptual structure
of this central and pervasive topic7 compared with similar debate over the
criminal justice system.8 In this article, an attempt will be made to explore
the general operation of the dispute-resolution process, with special reference
to the crucial and intimate relationship between the formal and informal
branches of that process. Each scheme depends upon the other in order to
achieve any degree of efficiency or efficacy; their relationship is mutually
supportive and truly symbiotic in nature. For the sake of clarity and gen-
erality, attention will be focused upon traditional disputes over private com-
mon law rights and not upon proceedings involving familial matters or
administrative affairs of a public nature.9
II. THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM
The various schemes that exist to resolve disputes between private par-
ties are intended to serve two functions. While they must bring about the
resolution of particular disputes between specific parties arising out of past
6Bentham, "The Principles of Judicial Procedure" in II The Works of Jeremy
Bentham, ed. Bowring (N.Y.: Russell & Russell Inc., 1962) at 6. The interdepend-
ence of substance and procedure is demonstrated by Cover, For James Win. Moore:
Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules (1975), 84 Yale L.J. 718; Scott, The
Impact of Class Actions on Rule 10b-5 (1971), 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 337.
7 The only sustained attempts to provide a rigorous analysis of the law of civil
procedure are made by Bentham, id. and Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication
(1978), 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353. In recent years, however, there have been a number of
serious attempts to remedy this state of affairs; see, inter alia, Engel and Steel, Civil
Cases and Society: Process and Order in the Civil Justice System (1979), 2 Amer. Bar.
Found. J. 295; MacLauchlan, American Legal Processes (N.Y.: John Wiley & Sons,
1977); Thibaut and Walker, A Theory of Procedure (1978), 66 Cal. L. Rev. 541;
Tullock, Trials on Trial: The Pure Theory of Legal Procedure (N.Y.: Colum. Univ.
Press, 1980); Cover and Fiss, The Structure of Procedure (N.Y.: Foundation Press,
1979).
8 The seminal work is that of Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (Calif.:
Stanford Univ. Press, 1968). This proposal precipitated a considerable and fruitful de-
bate. The major participants included, inter alia, Damaska, Structures of Authority and
Comparative Criminal Procedure (1975), 84 Yale L.J. 480; Goldstein, Reflections on
Two Models: Inquisitorial Themes in American Criminal Procedure (1974), 26 Stan. L.
Rev. 1009; Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure or a Third "Model" of the Crin-
inal Process (1970), 79 Yale L.J. 359.
9 For an excellent study of the relationship between the courts and the private
ordering of matrimonial disputes, see Mnookin and Kornhauser, Bargaining in the
Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce (1979), 88 Yale L.J. 950.
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activity, they must also provide a guide to govern future conduct.10 These
functions are not always compatible and are often in direct competition.
Nevertheless, it is crucial to the efficacy and efficiency of the civil justice
system that neither of these objectives be favoured to the exclusion of the
other, for each represents a state of affairs fundamental to the harmony and
fairness of society. This dilemma is brought out by Llewellyn and Hoebel:
Law has as one of its main purposes to make men go round in more or less clear
ways....
But there is more to law than intended and largely effective regulation and
prevention. Law has the peculiar job of cleaning up social messes when they have
been made. Law thus exists also for the event of breach of law and has a major
portion of its essence in the doing of something about such a breach.1"
These differing functions are rooted in competing conceptions of the
most desirable pattern of general social ordering and they hold very dissimi-
lar implications for the design and development of the legal process.12 At
different times and in different ways, the Anglo-Canadian legal system has
sought to strike an uneasy balance between the two objectives; a striking
illustration is the relationship between the formal and the informal schemes
of dispute-resolution. In this regard, the dispute-resolution process forms a
vital strand in the "tissue of paradox" that makes up the law.'
3
10 For a rigorous analysis of the relationship between those functions, see Steele,
Fraud, Dispute, and the Consumer: Responding to Consumer Complaints (1975), 123
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1107 at 1111-17 and Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation:
Dispute-Settlement and Rulemaking (1976), 89 Harv. L. Rev. 637 passim.
11Llewellyn and Hoebel, The Cheyenne Way (Norman: Univ. of Okla. Press,
1941) at 20.
12 In more technical terms, these two views of society have been labelled "mechani-
cal" and "organic." For a classic discussion of the impact of this dualistic approach to
social activity, see Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society, trans. Simpson (N.Y.:
Free Press, 1933).
1S Jenkins, Social Order and the Limits of Law: A Theoretical Essay (Princeton:
Princeton Univ. Press, 1980) at 58. It was Cardozo who gave prominence, through his
eloquent writing, to the "ancient mysteries" of the law:
The reconciliation of the irreconcilable, the merger of antitheses, the synthesis of
opposites, these are the great problems of the law. "Nomos," one might fairly
say, is the child of antinomies and is born of them in travail. We fancy ourselves
to be dealing with some ultra-modern controversy, the product of the clash of
interests in an industrial society. The problem is laid bare, and at its core are
the ancient mysteries crying out for understanding-rest and motion, the one and
the many, the self and the not-self, freedom and necessity, reality and appearance,
the absolute and the relative. We have the claims of stability to be harmonized
with those of progress. We are to reconcile liberty with equality, and both of
them with order. The property rights of the individual we are to respect, yet we
are not to press them to the point at which they threaten the welfare or the
security of the many. We must preserve to justice its universal quality, and yet
leave to it the capacity to be individual and particular.
Deep beneath the surface of the legal system, hidden in the structure of the
constituent atoms, are these attractions and repulsions, uniting and dissevering
as in one unending paradox.
The Paradoxes of Legal Science (N.Y.: Colum. Univ. Press, 1928) at 4-7.
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Within the primitive communities of the Anglo-Saxons and the Nor-
mans, men settled their differences by resort to self-help and violence.' 4 While
such methods could be tolerated on a small scale, their uninhibited escalation
constituted a real threat to social order and harmony. Accordingly, the State,
in order to preserve a peaceful and settled social order and to retain control
over its citizens, introduced a formal state sanctioned system of dispute-
resolution through which citizens could vindicate their legal rights. 1 The
formal system of civil litigation was thus conceived out of concern for mat-
ters of a public rather than a private nature; the focus was upon the peaceful
termination of controversies rather than the just resolution of disputes. By
way of balance, however, the formal system that was developed owed much
of its character and format to the private nature of most disputes. Indeed,
the adversarial mode of argument that has characterized the formal system
since its foundation ensures that, even today, "litigation resembles war-
fare."'1 As Lord Denning declared, "in litigation as in war.' 7
Despite the shifting emphasis of various rules and procedures, the basic
distinguishing features of traditional civil adjudication have remained the
same:
(1) The lawsuit is bipolar. Litigation is organized as a contest between two indi-
viduals or at least two unitary interests, diametrically opposed, to be decided on a
winner-take-all basis.
(2) Litigation is retrospective. The controversy is about an identified set of com-
plete events: whether they occurred, and if so, with what consequences for the
legal relations of the parties.
(3) Right and remedy are interdependent. The scope of the relief is derived more
or less logically from the substantive violation under the general theory that the
plaintiff will get compensation measured by the harm caused by the defendant's
breach of duty-in contract by giving plaintiff the money he would have had
absent the breach; in tort by paying the value of the damage caused.
(4) The lawsuit is a self-contained episode. The impact of the judgment is con-
fined to the parties. If plaintiff prevails there is a simple compensatory transfer,
usually of money, but occasionally the return of a thing or the performance of a
definite act. If defendant prevails, a loss lies where it has fallen. In either case,
entry of judgment ends the court's involvement.
14 For an excellent historical introduction to civil procedural law, see Millar, Civil
Procedure of the Trial Court in Historical Perspective (N.Y.: The National Conference
of Judicial Councils, 1952).
15 For a jurisprudential account of the significance of this step in the development
of a legal system, see H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press,
1961) at 89-96. The significance and character of this stage in the evolution of the legal
process has been forcefully and elegantly stated by Kiralfy:
In a primitive community men do not naturally go to law to right a wrong; force
and arms is the instinctive act as we can still see in international affairs. But self
help by man against man without restraint or control must lead to anarchy. To
end this evil influence leaders have laboured to find a peaceful solution by appeal
to the law, but the process has been slow.
Potter's Historical Introduction to English Law, ed. Kiralfy (4th ed. London: Sweet &
Maxwell, 1962) at 313.
16 Moore quoted by Frank, Courts on Trial: Myth and Reality in American Justice
(Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1959) at 8.
17 Burmah Oil Co. v. Bank of England, [1979] 1 W.L.R. 473 at 484 (C.A.).
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(5) The process is party-initiated and party-controlled. The case is organized and
the issues defined by exchanges between the parties. Responsibility for fact de-
velopment is theirs. The trial judge is a neutral arbiter of their interactions who
decides questions of law only if they are put in issue by an appropriate move of
a party.18
Although the formal system of civil litigation provides a unique and indis-
pensable "agenc[y] of society for the adjustment of disputes between liti-
gants,"' 9 society is ill-served by a system that obliges citizens to submit any
legal dispute to a full-blown contest of a formal, adversarial nature; the cost
to society at large, legal institutions, and the individual litigants is much too
high.20
The legal process is incapable of handling anything but a fraction of the
legal disputes that arise. It is estimated that fewer than five per cent of dis-
putes involve any contact with the formal system; of these, only about four
percent in the United States and two percent in the United Kingdom and
Canada ever proceed far enough to require a court verdict, and fewer than
five percent of these are appealed.21 If these figures were only marginally
increased, the formal system would collapse under its own weight. And even
a relatively small formal system entails a sizeable charge on public funds for
the provision of trained personnel and appropriate accommodation. More-
over, the extremely high cost of the formal process, both economically and
otherwise, is debilitating to individual litigants. The adversarial system of
18 Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation (1976), 89 Harv. L.
Rev. 1281 at 1282-83 (footnotes omitted).
19 Morgan, Judicial Notice (1944), 57 Harv. L. Rev. 269.
20 Although there is some public interest in resolving private disputes, the expendi-
ture of public monies on this activity is kept within very strict and relatively modest
limits. For instance, in 1970, Burger, the American Chief Justice, stated that the entire
cost of the federal judicial system amounted to $128 million which would only have
paid for about two-thirds of the cost of a C-5A airplane; see Kaufman, Court Crisis:
A Matter of Volume and Money (1971), 10 Judges' J. 49 at 50. For a critical examina-
tion of the priorities and allocation of resources, see Hazard, Rationing Justice (1965),
8 J.L. & Econ. 1. In 1979, out of a total budget of $556 million for the federal judicial
system the U.S. judiciary received under $15 million (less than 3%); see United States
Office of Management and Budget, Executive Office and The Presidency, Special Anal-
ysis: Budget of U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 1981 (Washington, 1980) at 19. See
generally, Brennan, Judicial Fiscal Independence (1971), 23 U. Fla. L. Rev. 277 and
Roush, Financing the Judiciary: Time for a New Approach (1974), Ariz. St. L.J. 639.
21 There are no official statistics on this matter. Therefore, these estimates are based
upon data drawn from a wide range of sources. These include, inter alia, Conard et al.,
Automobile Accident Costs and Payments (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Mich., 1964) at 181-
90; Ross, Settled Out of Court (Chicago: Aldine Press, 1970) at 218-23; Ison, The
Forensic Lottery (London: Staples Press, 1967) at 155; Atiyah, Accidents, Compensa-
tion and the Law (3d ed. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1980) at 270-80; Frank-
lin, Chanin and Mark, "Accidents, Money and the Law," in Dollars Delay and the
Automobile Victim (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968) at 38-40; Linden, The Report
of the Osgoode Hall Study on Compensation for Victims of Automobile Accidentu
(1965); The Report of the Committee on Personal Injuries Litigation [hereinafter Winn
Report] (London: H.M.S.O., 1968) Cmnd. 3691 at para. 116; and Royal Commission
on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury (London: H.M.S.O., 1978)
Cmnd. 7054, vol. 2 at para. 394.
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case-presentation is almost guaranteed to exacerbate conflict. The winner-
takes-all basis of the system simply serves to compound the resentment of at
least one of the litigants.22 In short, civil litigation tends to be disruptive
rather than therapeutic.
Thus, it is in the general interest of the community that litigation
"should not be allowed to drag festeringly on for an indefinite period."23 The
maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litiuM24 says it all. The almost universal
official approval of this sentiment reflects the widespread assumption that the
formal system not only fails to eradicate social disharmony but actually exac-
erbates it, and that litigation must be actively discouraged, as a positive
social evil. 25 It seems indisputable that society's welfare is best maintained if
disputants work out their own problems, involving the courts only as a last
resort: "settlement of litigation is very much in the public interest... ; [t]he
sooner and more placably disputes within it are resolved, the better in general
for society."26
The whole formal system of civil litigation is structured on a crucial
paradox. Although the system originated and exists to provide an official
2 2 See text accompanying notes 40-43, infra.
2 3 Edwards v. Edwards, [1968] 1 W.L.R. 149 at 150, [1967] 2 All E.R. 1032 at
1033 (D.C.) per Sir Jocelyn Simon.
24 2 Co. Inst. 360. There is ample and respectable judicial dicta to confirm the
reliance placed upon this principle; see Re May (1885), 28 Ch. D. 516 at 518, 52 L.T.
78 at 79 per Brett M.R. ("it is one of the most fundamental doctrines of all courts.");
Ferrers v. Arden (1599), 6 Co. Rep. 7a at 9a, 77 E.R. 263 at 266 ("the common law
... abhors infiniteness"); Lockyer v. Ferryman (1887), 2 App. Cas. 519 at 530 per
Lord Blackburn ("it is in the interest of the state that there should be an end of litiga-
tion"); and Green v. Weatherill, [1929] 2 Ch. 213 at 221, [1929] All E.R. 428 at 432,
98 L.J. Ch. 369 at 373 per Maugham J. ("[it is] a fundamental doctrine.., that there
must be an end to litigation").
25See Harvey, A Job for Jurisprudence (1944), 7 Mod. L. Rev. 42 at 45.
2 6A.G. v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [1974] A.C. 273 at 317, [1973] 3 W.L.R. 298
at 324-25, [1973] 3 All E.R. 54 at 79 (H.L.) per Lord Simon. From an economic
standpoint, society benefits considerably if parties determine whether settlement is more
profitable since judicial resources will thereby be used more efficiently.
Society at large also benefits when parties can accurately determine if settlement
is profitable, because judicial resources are then used more efficiently. Judicial
resources are squandered if parties proceed to formal adjudication in cases where
settlement would be more profitable for each, and society suffers when litigants
devote their own resources to litigation needlessly. Society has no interest in ad-
judicating disputes between parties who would choose to settle if they knew their
bargaining limits. Society therefore benefits when parties are enabled to identify
situations in which settlement is more profitable to each but in which they would
otherwise have proceeded to formal adjudication.
See Friedman, An Analysis of Settlement (1969), 22 Stan. L. Rev. 67 at 88 and gen-
erally, the text accompanying notes 52-83, infra.
Similar sentiments were expressed by the Law Reform Committee who took the
view that:
It has always been regarded as being in the public interest that persons should
settle their private differences without recourse to litigation and, if litigation is
started, that it should be brought to an end by compromise as soon as possible
so that time and expense to the parties may be saved.
See Privilege in Civil Proceedings (London: H.M.S.O., 1967), Cmnd. 3472 at para. 34.
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forum in -which private disputes can be thoroughly investigated and resolved,
it relies for any measure of efficacy on the vast majority of disputes being
settled outside of the system. The formal scheme itself actively encourages
and provides incentives for prospective litigants to settle their own disputes:
"the purpose of a law-suit is not only to do substantial justice but also to
bring an end to litigation."27 Does this elevate the "normative" aspect of the
civil justice system above the interests of achieving full and fair resolution
of particular disputes? The imbalance is more apparent than real. As Kaufman
has said, "the extraordinarily high percentage of settlements [is] an index of
injustice that reflects the malevolent workings of the twin demons that plague
our judicial system: cost and delay."28 In short, justice delayed and over-
priced is justice denied. While affording each individual litigant the fullest
means to ensure that an accurate and just decision is reached, care must be
taken that mechanisms are not "imposed beyond the point at which the costs
or delays they involve outweigh the benefits from the additional accuracy
they secure."2 9
III. A LEGAL SYMBIOSIS
The valid aims, therefore, of the formal procedural system must be, in
Benthamite terms, to maximize the occurrence of accurate decisions while
at the same time minimizing the unavoidable hazards of delay and expense.8 0
Accordingly, the barriers to formal adjudication can be defended on the basis
that they shift the cost-benefit equation towards the non-judicial resolution
of disputes, and that their removal would impede the fair resolution of actual
disputes within the system.31 The crucial and enduring difficulty lies, how-
ever, not so much in striking a general balance, but rather in discovering its
precise and detailed location. Notwithstanding this central problem, the fun-
damental objectives remain clear:
(1) to permit full development of the contentions and evidentiary pos-
sibilities of the various parties, with the aim of deciding the case upon its
merits; and
(2) to bring adjudication to a final conclusion with reasonable prompt-
ness and within reasonable limits of cost.
3 2
In this respect, the ascertainment of truth, while important, must not be the
sole determinant of the most appropriate apportionment of relief. Truth must
27 James and Hazard, Civil Procedure (2d ed. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1978)
at 532.
28 For an extensive investigation of the problem of delay, see Ziesel, Kalven and
Buchholz, Delay in Court (2d ed. Westport: Greenwood, 1978); Kaufman, Judicial
Reform in the Next Century (1976), 29 Stan. L. Rev. 1.
20 Grey, Procedural Fairness and Substantive Rights (1977), 18 Nomos 181 at 185.
30 Supra note 6, at 8.
31 For a sound intellectual history of this compromise, see Muller, The Forest of
Due Process of Law: The American Constitutional Tradition (1977), 18 Nomos 3.
32 Supra note 27, at 530.
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be subordinate to justice.33 The task of the judge is not to reconstruct the
past and ascertain historically whether the plaintiff has a genuine claim. The
judge's responsibility is much more modest; it is to decide whether the plain-
tiff has "established his claim by lawful evidence. '34 Indeed, many of the
rules of evidence are capable of being construed as obstacles to the pursuit
of truth. A hindrance of the truth-finding process is considered justified in
order to protect interests of sufficient social importance.35 As Viscount Simon
L.C. said, "[a] court of law.., is not engaged in ascertaining ultimate veri-
ties: it is engaged in determining what is the proper result to be arrived at,
having regard to the evidence before it."36 The formal system of dispute-
resolution by civil litigation makes a massive contribution to improving the
performance of the informal system. Indeed, the private settlement process
operates within the shadow and with the forbearance of the official institu-
tions and procedures. Although most law books and law reports suggest
otherwise, civil litigation occurs only if the informal process of dispute-
resolution has been unable to settle the conflict between the parties. Far from
being the norm, civil litigation is but a function of the failure of the parties
to settle their dispute informally. In this sense, the courts are nothing more
than the final segment along a continuum of settlement processes, an institu-
tion of last resort.37 The courts provide a second level process for achieving
the resolution of a dispute that could not be settled at the first level.38 By
moving from one level to another, the parties have not only escalated their
conduct, but they have also radically altered the tone and character of their
relationship. 9 Not only does the relationship become triadic as opposed to
dyadic, but the very nature of the dispute changes as it becomes necessary
to frame and present it in purely legal terms.
In the currently popular parlance of game theory, civil litigation is a
zero-sum game.40 In the great majority of disputes, the court has to decide,
3 3 For a thorough examination of the fundamental dichotomy between the objec-
tives of truth and justice, see Thibaut and Walker, supra note 7, at 542-44.
34Viscount Kilmuir, The Migration of the Common Law (1960), 76 L.Q.R. 39
at 43.
35 See Evan, "Value Conflicts in the Law of Evidence" in The Sociology of Law:
A Social-Structural Perspective, ed. Evan (N.Y.: Free Press, 1980) at 100-66; and
McCormick, A Handbook of the Law of Evidence (N.Y.: West, 1954) at s. 105.
36 Hickman v. Peacey, [1945] A.C. 304 at 318, [1945] 2 All E.R. 215 at 220
(H.L.).
37 See MacLauchlan, supra note 7, at 9.
Z8 See Golding, "On the Adversary System and Justice" in Philosophical Law, ed.
Bronaugh (Conn.: Greenwood, 1978) at 98.
39 See Golding, "Preliminaries to the Study of Procedural Justice" in Law, Reason
and Justice, ed. Hughes (N.Y.: New York Univ., 1969) at 86.
40 See, generally, Luce and Raiffa, Games and Decisions (N.Y.: John Wiley &
Sons, 1957). While this analysis is revealing and instructive, it does tend to de-
personalize the whole process unnecessarily. As Thompson opined in his minority report
to the Winn Committee, "reference has been made to this part of litigation being
treated as a 'game'. It may be a game for everyone else and it may be a purely financial
matter for everyone else, but it certainly is not a game for the injured person." Supra
note 21, at 160, para. 12.
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no matter how evenly the facts may be balanced, which party has won. As
Mr. Justice Brandeis observed, "to be effective in this world you have to
decide which side is probably right and, once you decide, you must act as if
it were one hundred percent right." 41 This means that, in such a situation,
one party will benefit to the extent that the other loses. In economic terms,
it is a zero-sum game because the parties are not in conflict over some public
or external group of resources, but over the allocation of their own resources;
the gain to one party is exactly the same as the loss to the other. In order
to avoid an all-or-nothing outcome, the parties will often be prepared to
engage in negotiations in the hope that they may reach a compromise that is
mutually acceptable to both. Rather than run the risk of losing entirely, if
the dispute goes to court, a party will often be prepared to accept a lower
sum or pay out a higher sum than the court might require. The settlement
process is, therefore, a situation in which the parties co-operate to arrive at a
compromise, while, at the same time, it enables them to compete so that the
nature of the compromise is in each party's best interests. 42 The necessary,
but not sufficient condition for settlement negotiations is that both parties
believe that there is a range of possible agreements that are preferable to no
agreement at all; that is, in the event of no agreement, resort will have to be
made to the all-or-nothing proceedings of civil litigation.
43
The courts contribute in a variety of ways, both directly and indirectly,
to the improved performance and increased use of the informal scheme of
dispute resolution. These different contributions can be loosely grouped to-
gether in two categories. First, procedural devices have been developed that
seek to facilitate the settlement process by stimulating and creating an en-
vironment in which successful negotiation and compromise is most likely to
occur; steps are taken to enable each party to discover the other's case and
to encourage parties to make settlements in the confidence that such agree-
ments will be adhered to. Second, rules have been introduced that exert a
strong influence upon the timing, type, occurrence and terms of compromises
actually reached.
IV. THE DYNAMICS OF SETTLEMENT
The determinants of the litigation-settlement decision are extremely
subtle and complicated. Many factors conjoin and interact to create "a com-
4' Quoted by Coons in Compromise as Precise Justice (1980), 68 Cal. L. Rev. 250
at 260.
42 See Deutsch and Krauss, Studies in Interpersonal Bargaining (1962), 6 J. of
Conft. Res. 53. As Ikl6 has observed, "[n]egotiation is a process in which explicit pro-
posals are put forward ostensibly for the purpose of reaching agreement on an exchange
or the realization of a common interest where conflicting interests exist." How Nations
Negotiate (N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1964) at 3-4. It must also be remembered that "nego-
tiation is not a phase, but an aspect of the settlement process"; see Ross, supra note 21,
at 175.
43 For a general account of the dispute settlement see Aubert, Courts and Conflict
Resolution (1967), 11 J. of Conf. .Res. 40 and Gulliver, Negotiation as a Mode of
Dispute Settlement: Towards a General Model (1973), 7 Law & Soc. Rev. 667.
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plex of dynamic interactions. '44 In general terms, they can be reduced to
four main categories: socio-political, psychological, economic and legal. The
propensity to litigate may vary from one ethnic or cultural group to another.
For instance, the cultural heritage of some groups will provide a strong
impetus to the resolution of disputes by informal negotiation rather than by
resorting to a formal confrontation before a third party.45 Some tentative
studies suggest that the urbanite shows a greater willingness to litigate than
his rural counterpart. In part, this stems from the fact that "a crowded,
competitive urban society creates more conflicts than a diffuse, rural, largely
self-sufficient society."46 Also, it is likely that only citizens who perceive the
courts as an impartial and apolitical forum and who are prepared to accept
the decisions of the courts as final, will enter into litigation. This means that
minority groups may be less likely to litigate as a result of built-in prejudices
and biases that they claim the society at large has against them.
47
A vital factor in determining the likelihood of litigation is the psycho-
logical response of the parties to the prospect of litigation. Resort to litiga-
tion depends in part upon the different attitudes of the parties towards risk;
the more averse a party is to risk the less likely is litigation. The parties must
assess the extent of the risk involved and evaluate their own responses to
such risk.48 Although there is a marked lack of empirical data, it is assumed
by most observers that most parties are risk-averse in a situation where liti-
gation is a possible choice. Furthermore, their risk-aversion will increase as
the stakes at issue increase. Particular disputants, however, differ in their
attitudes to risk. Disputants who are regularly involved in the dispute resolu-
tion process, such as insurance companies, will be able to spread the
risk, for "in litigating large numbers of cases, the insurance company is able
to regard the choice between certainty and the gamble with indifference. '49
Except for claims involving very large amounts of money, such regular par-
ticipants in the litigation process will be able to use their indifference as a
strategic ploy to influence the bargaining negotiations. In global terms, this
44 Gold, "The Court's Authority to Award Costs Against Lawyers" in Studies in
Civil Procedure, ed. Gertner (Toronto: Butterworths, 1979) at 86.
45 See Kawashima, "Dispute Resolution in Contemporary Japan" in Von Mehren,
ed., Law in Japan: The Legal Order in a Changing Society (Cambridge: Harv. Univ.
Press, 1963) at 41 and Cohen, Chinese Meditation on the Eve of Modernization (1966),
54 Col. L. Rev. 1201.
46 Hufstedler, The Future of Civil Litigation (1980), Utah L. Rev. 753 at 755.
See generally, Wanner, The Public Ordering of Private Relations Part One: Civil Cases
in Urban Trial Courts (1974), 8 Law & Soc. Rev. 421 and The Public Ordering of
Private Relations Part Two: Winning Civil Court Cases (1975), 9 Law & Soc. Rev. 293;
Hunting and Neuwirth, Who Sues in New York City: A Study of Automobile Claims
(N.Y.: Colum. Univ. Press, 1962).
47 See Jacob, Mlack and White Perceptions of Justice in the City (1971), 6 Law &
Soc. Rev. 69.
4 8 See generally, Davie and Lefrere, Risk and Chance (Milton Keyes: Open Univ.,
1980).
49 Ross, supra note 21, at 214. For a stimulating analysis of the advantages gained
by "repeat players" over "one-shotters," see Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out
Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change (1974), 9 L. & Soc. Rev. 95.
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will give negotiations an asymetrical structure. 50 Moreover, the fact that an
institutional party is risk-neutral will increase the risk aversion of an indi-
vidual litigant for whom the experience of litigation is likely to be a unique
and often stressful event.
51
The economic model of dispute resolution is the most precise and
rigorous available. 5 2 It seeks to explain the dispute resolution process by
analysing the economic factors that influence and dictate the choice between
litigation and settlement. In general economic terms, the parties operate as
participants in a situation of "bilateral monopoly" in which each party can
transact or deal only with the other party.5 The potential plaintiff can sell
only to the potential defendant, and the potential defendant can buy only
from the potential plaintiff; the market is in this way restricted. Within such
a contextual model, various economic forces will combine to determine
whether there is a "sale" of the claim, or a resort to litigation.
In order for a settlement to occur, there must exist a "bargaining range"
within which both parties will agree to settle. The precise placing of the
actual compromise will depend upon the relative bargaining abilities of the
parties. As the mutual costs of litigation will almost always exceed those
of settlement, it is reasonable to expect that it will nearly always be in the
best interests of the parties to settle their dispute rather than litigate upon
it.6 In most cases, the prospect of litigation will appear dark and dangerous;
negotiation will offer a welcome opportunity to pursue a more certain and
fruitful avenue of resolution. Indeed, assuming that the parties act rational-
ly,56 litigation will only take place where the anticipated loss to the potential
50 See Phillips and Hawkins, Some Economic Aspects of the Settlement Process
(1976), 39 Mod. L. Rev. 497 at 505 and generally, Clayton, Creating Risk in Negotia-
tion and Settlement Techniques, [1966] Insurance Law Journal 465.
51 See Aubert, supra note 43, at 45 and infra note 76.
52 See, inter alia, Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflict (1973), 2 J. of Leg. St.
279; Friedman, supra note 26, Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (2d ed. Boston:
Little, Brown & Co., 1977) at 450-53 and An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure
and Judicial Administration (1973), 2 J. of Leg. St. 399 at 428-29 and 437-38; Tullock,
supra note 7, at 71-78 and 105-18; Hirsch, Law and Economics: An Introductory
Analysis (N.Y.: Academic Press, 1979) at 186-88; and Priest, Selective Characteristics
of Litigation (1980), 9 J. of Leg. St. 399 at 401-402.
0 See Atiyah, supra note 21, at 308-309.
54 See Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harv. Univ. Press, 1969)
at 21-46 and 67-74.
55 This may not be the case, for instance, if one of the parties is an institutional
defendant, such as an insurance company, which might wish to pursue a claim in cir-
cumstances in which it would lose economically in the short-term, but would benefit
in the long-term. For example, it may wish to have a particular point of law clarified
or, as a strategic ploy, demonstrate to potential plaintiffs that it is actually prepared
to take cases to trial.
50 By rationally, it is simply meant that a litigant will have the maximization of
wealth as the sole behavioural objective. For the purposes of the ensuing discussion,
an irrational litigant is one who brings an action for purely non-economic reasons, such
as harassment of a defendant or out of sheer vindictiveness. This concept of "rational-
ity" has been a critical focus for much of the opposition to the "law and economics"
movement; see Posner, The Economic Approach to Law (1975), 53 Tex. L. Rev. 757
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defendant of litigating is less than the anticipated gain to the potential plain-
tiff of litigating. If the plaintiff anticipates that the least to be gained by liti-
gating is $10,000 and the defendant anticipates that the most to be lost is
$8,000, litigation will occur. The parties should take into account, however,
their costs incurred in reaching such a settlement. If settlement costs amount
to $500 each, the plaintiff would not settle for anything less than $10,500
and the defendant for not more than $7,500.
The determinants of anticipated gains and losses5 7 are threefold: the
amount of the judgment if the plaintiff wins, the chances of the plaintiff win-
ning, and the costs of litigating. Each party's estimate of the amount of the
judgment if the plaintiff wins will obviously have a significant effect on the
figures involved. Typically, this will be the case in disputes over personal
injuries. In such circumstances, the crucial factor will be the quantity of in-
formation available to each side.5 8 The theoretical impact on the economic
model of dispute-resolution of the parties' disagreement over the estimated
amount of the judgment, however, is negligible. Although it will influence the
actual amounts at which each party is willing to settle, it does not disturb
the validity of the method by which such amounts are calculated. Conse-
quently, it will be assumed in the ensuing discussion that the dispute is over
a fixed amount or that there is agreement over the expected amount of the
judgment if the plaintiff wins.
In order to assess the chances of the plaintiff winning, it will be neces-
sary for the parties to evaluate the prospects of their version of the facts
being accepted by the court, to predict the rules of law which will be relied
upon by the court and to estimate how these rules of law will be applied to
those facts. This is a daunting but very necessary exercise to be carried out
by the parties and it provides one of the main reasons for employing legal
professional assistance. The lawyer's experience and expertise facilitates the
making of a most informed and reasonable assessment of such probabilities.59
and Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law (1979), 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 281. The
rational act is nothing more than the consistent act, a consistent preference from those
choices available. The emphasis is on what decisions are made rather than on procedural
rationality. The assumption of rationality is based on predictions as to aggregate be-
haviour of a heterogeneous mass of people and, therefore, fails to consider the irra-
tionality of individuals which is exactly the type of behaviour the law must grapple
with; see Hollis and Nell, Rational Economic Man (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ.
Press, 1975) and Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioural Foundations ol
Economic Theory (1977), 6 Phil. and Pub. Affairs 317. Furthermore, behaviour may
appear rational, but motivations may be highly irrational. A greater understanding of
the general psychology of human decision-making is required; see Fried, Right and
Wrong (Cambridge: Harv. Univ. Press, 1978) at 81-107.
57Another phrase, of a more technical nature, used to describe such amounts, is
"the discounted value of the claim."
5 For a general discussion of the means relied upon to increase the volume and
quality of information available to each party, see text accompanying notes 118-27,
infra.
59 Also, it shifts the economic responsibility. The client will be able to recover from
the lawyer any loss suffered as a result of the lawyer's negligent miscalculation of the
assessment of the risks involved (i.e., the amount that was likely to be recovered in
the original litigation).
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In addition to the respective anticipation of gains and losses, the matter of
litigation costs will exert a very direct and quantifiable influence on the settle-
ment-litigation decision. Indeed, the rules governing the incidence and re-
sponsibility for the costs of litigation represent one of the major devices by
which the courts attempt to influence significantly the settlement-litigation
decision.
A. The Costs Rules
The expense incurred in staffing and maintaining the courts is met large-
ly by the state, the litigant paying only a minimal sum to utilize these facili-
ties.G0 The major financial burden incurred by the parties is the cost of legal
representation. A lesser expense is the payment of incidental expenses: "dis-
bursements," which are incurred throughout the litigation. In allocating this
burden, the legal system has two obvious alternative solutions:61 it can per-
mit costs to lie where they fall and leave litigants to pay their own costs,
regardless of the outcome of the litigation, or it can order that costs should
follow the event and require the unsuccessful litigant to pay the costs of the
successful litigant. Whereas the Americans have adopted the former as a gen-
eral rule, the Anglo-Canadian system has opted for a general rule of indem-
nity. 2 In practice, this means that any costs that have been reasonably
incurred in litigating the dispute may be recovered by the successful litigant,
provided that his or her conduct is not of a kind that should result in no
entitlement.A5
There has been a wealth of literature on the advantages and disad-
6o See supra note 20.
61 For an introductory summary of the various relevant considerations in making
such a choice, see Watson and Williams, Canadian Civil Procedure: Cases and Materials
(2d ed. Toronto: Butterworths, 1977) at 2-3 to 2-29.
02 The principle that the loser ought to pay the costs of the winner was originally
not part of the common law. In an action at law, taxable costs are entirely a creature
of statute. First introduced in 1275 by the Statute of Gloucester, 6 Ed. I, c. 1, s. 2,
costs became available in all actions only from 1667; see 4 Jac. I, c. 3. For a short
history of costs, see Goodhart, Costs (1929), 38 Yale L.J. 849 and Note, Use of Tax-
able Costs to Regulate the Conduct of Litigation (1953), 53 Col. L. Rev. 78. Colonial
America initially followed the English practice: see Atkinson v. Williams (1670), 3
Records of the Court of Assistants, Massachusetts Bay Colony 203, Clarke v. Davis
(1662), id. at 130 and Hakins v. Goodin (1660), id. at 86. So great was the hostility,
however, to the legal profession that the amount recoverable was severely restricted:
see, Colonial Laws of New York (1709), c. 185. By the nineteenth century, the recovery
of costs was restricted to disbursements in most jurisdictions: see Oelrichs v. Spain, 15
Wall 211, 21 L. Ed. 43 (1872); Dallas v. Dallas, 222 Iowa 42, 268 N.W. 516 (1936).
Although this principle still applies generally today at the federal level, there are over
thirty states which permit the recovery of costs from the losing party: see Hirsch, supra
note 52, at 187. Several of these states, however, only allow plaintiffs to so recover.
The general "American rule" was confirmed by the Supreme Court in 1975; see Alyeska
Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Soc., 421 U.S. 240, 44 L.E. (2d) 141, 95 S.C. 1612
(1975).
63For an account of these circumstances, see Jacob et al. The Supreme Court
Practice (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1979) vol. 1 at 925-1069 and Watson, supra
note 61, at 2-18 to 2-36.
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vantages of each approach.64 The general conclusion is that neither of the
solutions is without its drawbacks and each can produce hardship.05 The
Anglo-Canadian rule, based on the notion of fault, exacerbates the already
harsh consequences of the all-or-nothing character of litigation.,6 Also, while
it may serve to discourage frivolous litigation, it may result in meritorious
and novel claims, which might be in the public interest to have litigated,
not being pursued or pressed. On the other hand, the American rule, it is
argued, increases the volume of litigation and, therefore, contributes to court
congestion. Further, it fails to compensate justly the winner whose claim has
been vindicated, and it discourages the litigation of small claims. Although
these observations are informative, they are very generalized in nature and
lack a necessary degree of precision. The advantage of the economic model
is that it is able to explain with a relatively high degree of precision and
exactness the very real differences that flow from reliance upon the American
or Anglo-Canadian costs rules.
In short, the different schemes to litigation costs will affect, in various
ways and to various extents, the discounted values of the parties' claims.
Under a legal system in which the costs of litigation are distributed according
to the American rule, litigation will occur only if the lowest amount the
potential plaintiff is prepared to accept is greater than the highest amount
that the defendant is prepared to offer.67 On this basis, providing litigation
costs exceed settlement costs,68 as they almost invariably will, litigation will
-64 Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society (1966), 54
Calif. L. Rev. 792; Ehrenzweig, Shall Counsel Fees be Allowed (1951), 26 Calif. S.B.J.
107; Goodhart, Costs, supra note 62; Greenberger, Appellate Review in England and
the United States-Who Bears the Ultimate Burden? (1963), 1 Duquesne L. Rev. 161;
Greenberger, The Cost of Justice: An American Problem, An English Solution (1964),
9 Viii. L. Rev. 400; Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation?
(1963), 49 Iowa L. Rev. 75; Lyman, Our Obsolete System of Taxable Costs (1951),
25 Conn. B.J. 148; McCormick, Counsel Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation as an
Element of Damages (1931), 15 Minn. L. Rev. 619; Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included
in Costs: A Logical Development (1966), 38 U. Colo. L. Rev. 202; Note (1953), 53
Colum. L. Rev. 78; Tunney, Financing the Costs of Enforcing Legal Rights (1974),
122 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 632; Note, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access
to the Courts (1974), 122 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 636; Mause, Winner Takes All: A Re-
examination of the Indemnity System (1969), 55 Iowa L. Rev. 26; Sands, Attorney's
Fees as Recoverable Costs (1977), 63 A.B.A.J. 510.
65 See Watson and Williams, supra note 61, at 2-5.
66 See text accompanying notes 40-43, supra.
67 This model is viable only if it is assumed that the parties to the dispute are risk-
neutral and that court costs are not prohibitive. Where J is the size of the judgment if
the plaintiff wins, Pp and Pd are the probability of the plaintiff winning as estimated by
each party, Cp and Cd are the litigation cost of each party and Sp and Sd are the settle-
ment costs of each party, the condition for litigation can be expressed
Pp J -Cp + Sp > Pd J + Cd- Sd
In order to isolate the impact of costs, if it is assumed that the litigation costs and
settlement costs of each party are the same, the condition for litigation can be alterna-
tively expressed as
(Pp- Pd) J > 2 (C - S)
68 In other words, provided the costs of settlement are not prohibitive per se and,
that in any event, the cost and expenses involved in reaching and implementing a settle-
ment do not exceed litigation costs.
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occur only if both parties are optimistic about the outcome of litigation.
Conversely, settlement will occur if both parties agree on the likelihood of
the plaintiff's winning or if one party is more pessimistic than the other. A
numerical example of these statements will clarify the point.0 Assume that
in an action for breach of contract, the judgment of a winning plaintiff is
$20,000, the litigation costs are $2,000 each and the settlements costs are
$500 each. If the plaintiff estimates a seventy-five percent chance of success,
but the defendant estimates the plaintiff's chances at only fifty percent, litiga-
tion will result as there is no amount that the parties will be able to arrive
at which will put both of them in a better position than if they litigated. The
defendant's highest offer of $11,500 will be less than the lowest offer of
$13,500 that the plaintiff is prepared to accept.-0
Under the American rule, it may be said that, in general, the likelihood
of litigation will increase as settlement costs and the probability of the plain-
tiff's winning, as estimated by both parties, increase; yet, the likelihood will
decrease as the costs of litigation increase. Consequently, a major defect of
such a regime is that it discourages small claims and tends to lead to exces-
sive litigation and lengthening of actions.71 On the other hand, providing a
litigant has some basic resources, it means that the parties commence on al-
most equal footing72 and, as Warren C.J. argued, "since litigation is at best
uncertain one should not be penalized for merely defending or prosecuting a
lawsuit." 73 Under a legal system that utilizes the Anglo-Canadian rule, there
will be a greater variance of returns. For instance, a plaintiff stanqs to receive
more when successful, but to lose more when unsuccessful. 74 It follows, there-
fore, that rather than resulting in less litigation as is traditionally assumed,
the Anglo-Canadian rule will result in more litigation than under the Ameri-
'9 The framework for this example and the figures used are loosely based upon a
similar example used in Stewart, Toward More Expeditious Civil Justice-Canadian and
American Perspectives (1979), 26 Wayne L. Rev. 31 at 34.
7 0 These figures are obtained by a simple introduction of the relevant figures into
the equations expression at note 67, supra.
(75% x 20,000) - 2,000 + 500> (50% x 20,000) + 2,000 - 500
13,500> 11,500
71 See statistics in text accompanying note 21, supra.
72 It will be apparent that litigants can never be placed on a truly equal footing.
Each litigant is entitled to expend any amount of resources desired on the litigation.
However, there is an optimal level of investment that will ensure the greatest returns:
see Tullock, supra note 7, at 148-59. With the advent of legal aid, access to courts has
become something of a middle-class problem. For a thorough and international appraisal
of this problem, see Access to Justice, ed. Cappelletti and Garth (Milan: Dott. A.
Giuffre Editore, 1978) vols. 1-6.
73 Freischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 383 U.S. 715 (1967).
74 Utilizing the same legend as in note 67, supra, this can be notationally expressed
as
Pp(J + Cp) - Cp - (1 - Pp)Cd + Sp > Pd(J + Cd) + Cd - (1 - Pd)Cd - Sd
In order to isolate the impact of costs, assuming litigation costs and settlement costs of.
each party are the same, the conditions for litigation can be alternately expressed as
(Pp - Pd)J > 2[ (Pd + 1 - Pp)C - s]
It will be assumed throughout that the indemnity will be a full one. In practice, of
course, the indemnity amounts to about seventy percent.
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can rule where the plaintiff's estimate of winning is greater than the defend-
ant's assessment of the plaintiff's chances of winning. Furthermore, where
the defendant is more optimistic about winning than the plaintiff is about
the defendant winning, it is immaterial whether the American or Anglo-
Canadian rule is used as litigation will occur under either regime. In the
example of a contract action, the defendant's highest offer will remain at
$11,500,75 and $14,500, instead of $13,500, will be the lowest offer the
plaintiff is prepared to accept. In effect, the parties are $1,000 further apart
than under the American rule.
On these calculations, it seems that the Anglo-Canadian rule leads to an
increase in the ratio of litigation to settlement. This conclusion is more ap-
parent than real, however, for it fails to take into account the impact that
the Anglo-Canadian rule has upon the parties' attitudes to risk. The Anglo-
Canadian rule results in the variance of returns being extended. Whereas
under the American rule the plaintiff would stand to gain $18,000 and lose
$2,000, a spread of $20,000, under the Anglo-Canadian rule the plaintiff
would stand to gain $20,000 and to lose $4,000; a spread of $24,000 or, in
other words, a twenty percent greater variance. Mindful of the fact that liti-
gants tend to be risk-averse, 76 this greater variance will encourage more
litigants to settle than under an American regime:
Fee shifting increases the stakes, as a result of which risk-averse persons could be
expected to calculate their chances of winning more carefully than when the
stakes do not include the opponents' fees and to refrain from litigating many
one-sided cases.77
Furthermore, the Anglo-Canadian rule encourages or, at least, does not dis-
courage, poor citizens from pursuing or defending meritorious claims; that is,
those in which there is a better than fifty percent chance of succeeding.
Furthermore, the Anglo-Canadian rule offers less disincentive in the case of
small claims because the successful litigant will not be out of pocket, as
would be the result under the American rule.
75 The fact that the defendant's highest offer remains the same as under the Ameri-
can rule is due to the particular figure used; see text accompanying note 70, supra, It
will never be higher and it will usually be lower.
76 See text accompanying notes 49-51, supra. The psychological aspect of litigation
is extremely important and the costs rule uses the widespread fear of litigating to great
effect; "fear of courts ... plays a great part in discouraging people from using them ....
But the over-riding discouragement-the thing that prevents the most fearless potential
litigant from litigating-is expense." Consumer Council, Justice Out of Reach (London:
H.M.S.O., 1970) at 17. It is unseemly for the legal process to allow itself to be manipu-
lated in such a way for it is "being used as a threat to bring about an adjustment rather
than a means of adjudication," see Linden, Studies in Canadian Tort Law (Toronto:
Butterworths & Co., 1968) at 312. On the credit side, the indemnity system can be said
to operate as a psychological force on solicitors to hold down costs. If the client wins,
only those costs considered necessary will be reimbursed. But if the client loses, it im-
proves the chances of recovering the actual fees: see Kaplan, An American Lawyer in
the Queen's Courts: Impressions of English Civil Procedure (1971), 69 Mich. L. Rev.
821.
77 Sands, supra note 64, at 515.
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Under both the American and Anglo-Canadian regimes there is another
costs device that operates in tandem with the basic rule allocating costs.
Most legal systems possess elaborate procedures whereby one or both of the
parties can make a payment into court or a court-recognised offer to settle. 78
If a party accepts the offer or payment, the proceedings will come to an end.
If a party does not accept the offer or payment and fails to improve on the
offer or payment at trial, 79 that party will be obliged to bear his or her own
and the other parties' costs from the date of the offer or payment.80 The
effects of such procedures are rather crude. Although they do not affect the
discounted value of the claims, they do have a marked impact upon the vari-
ance of terms and, therefore, the degree of risk involved in litigation. For
78 The traditional method has been restricted to payments into court by a defend-
ant.-In recent years, however, it has been sought to extend this procedure to plaintiffs
and to include matters of a non-monetary nature. For instance, the British Columbia
Supreme Court Rules, r. 57(13)-(18) allow a plaintiff to make "an offer to settle...
specifying a sum that the plaintiff is willing to accept in satisfaction." However, this is
restricted to offers in monetary terms: see Hattco Marine Services Ltd. v. B.C. Hydro
and Power Authority (1979), 8 B.C.L.R. 307, 93 D.L.R.(3d) 764, 9 C.P.C. 149. The
new Ontario Rules are not so confined: Any party to a proceeding may serve upon an
adverse party an offer in writing to settle any claims in a proceeding and, where there
is more than one claim, to settle any one or more of them, on the terms therein speci-
fied," see Civil Procedure Revision Committee (Ministry of the A.G.: Toronto, 1980)
at r. 49.09 [hereinafter Proposed Rules].
79 Under such a procedure, the judge must not be informed of the existence or
amount of any such payment or offer until after judgment has been given. While this
judicial ignorance is obviously necessary, it does place the judge in a dilemma:
A judge nowadays does not know what amount has been paid into court, and it
is particularly galling for a judge whose mind may have been fluctuating between
£750 and Z1000 to find that because he chose the lower figure, the plaintiff
not only gets merely that lower figure, but also has to pay much of it away to
the defendant. Knowing how close a thing it was in his own mind, he does not
want a plaintiff to suffer because the payment into court happens to exceed the
amount he awards.
Findlay v. Railway Executive (1950), 66 T.L.R. (Pt. 2) 836 at 841, [1950] 2 All E.R.
969 at 972 per Denning L.J. In general, a judge retains some discretion and need not
make a rigid or automatic application of the procedure. For instance, the judge may
wish to take into account the difference between judgment and the amount paid in as a
percentage of the judgment or the time at which the payment was made: see Mangan
v. Mendum (1970), 4 A.C.T.R. 44 per Smithers J.
80 In Ont. and B.C., of course, the possible involvement of the plaintiff has meant
that slightly different co~ts rules have had to be devised. This has given rise to some
difficulty. In B.C. the plaintiff is entitled to double the costs he or she would be awarded
if successful, B.C. Rules of the Supreme Court, r. 57(18). In Ont. the sanction is in a
slightly more conventional form: see Proposed Rules, supra note 78, at r. 49.09(a):
Where an offer to settle was made by a plaintiff at least 10 days before the day
of which the trial or hearing of the proceeding commenced and the offer has not
been revoked, a plaintiff who obtains a judgment as favourable, or more favour-
able, than the terms of the offer to settle, shall be entitled to his party and party
costs to the date of the service of the offer to settle and his solicitor and client
costs thereafter, unless otherwise ordered.
In both cases, the plaintiff will recover almost 100% of all costs expended. The effect
of such rules is to increase the already considerable risk imposed on the defendant: see
text accompanying notes 76-77, supra.
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instance, under the English rule of "payment into court," the plaintiff will
stand to lose a further $2,000 in the example of a contract action.8' More-
over, the procedure operates unfairly. Whereas the only risk the defendant
runs is making an over-payment, the plaintiff has to contend with a con-
siderable addition to the risks being taken in continuing with the litigation. 82
In this regard, the only advantage of a procedure that allows both parties to
engage in the formal process of settlement is that the risk is spread evenly.
Nonetheless, the procedure still tends to favour the gambler, a rare or, more
importantly, institutional breed, and to penalize the more vulnerable and
numerous risk-averse.83
The conclusions to be drawn from this brief discussion can only be
general and tentative. First, many may take the view that treating civil justice
as a negotiable commodity is wrong and thus demeans the whole legal enter-
prise. In this regard, it has been said that:
[Tjhere are good bargains and bad ones. Any system resting on negotiation runs
into all of the problems of inequalities of bargaining power and skill. And some
will find it distasteful to consider that the product the legal system is supposed to
produce-justice-is transformed into a product to be bought and sold. Those
whose rights have been abridged are entitled to full vindication rather than the
half loaf they get because of the unpredictability of the outcome of litigation,
the expenses of the process and a discount for prompt payment.8 4
81 See text accompanying notes 69, supra. This figure ($2,000) is arrived at on
the assumption that litigation costs will be evenly divided before and after the payment
(i.e., costs of $1,000 up to payment-in and $1,000 afterwards). In such circumstances,
a plaintiff who wins but fails to recover more than the payment-in will be liable for
his or her own costs from payment-in ($1,000) and for those of the defendant ($1,000).
82 Indeed, the rules may encourage settlement to be made, but they do so by "re-
ducing the sum acceptable to the plaintiff, rather than by encouraging the defendant
to make a 'proper' offer": see Phillips and Hawkins, supra'note 50, at 509. A technical
and graphical account of the precise effect of such rules can be found in id. at 514-15
and Phillips, Hawkins and Flemming, Compensation for Personal Injuries (1975), 85
Econ. J. 129 at 131. As Bowles notes, "a given risk-averse plaintiff will.., settle for a
sum that is both below the... net damages expected (after payment-in) from the court
and is also below the sum for which he would have settled before the payment-in took
place." See Bowles, "Economic Aspects of Legal Procedures," in Burroughs and
Veljanovski, eds., The Economic Approach to Law (London: Butterworths, 1981) at 199.
In a study carried out by Zander, out of a sample of 664 personal injury cases in
London in 1973-74, payment-in was made in 272 (41%). It was accepted in 167
(61%). In 77 (71%) of 105 cases it was not accepted, the offer was improved and
accepted. Consequently, out of those 272 cases in which there was payment-in, 244
(90%) were settled: see Payment Into Court, [1975] N.L.J. 638.
83Although the extent of risk-aversion felt by most litigants has not been fully
appreciated, its recognition does not guarantee that it will be treated favourably or
sympathetically. For instance, the Winn Committee took the view that:
The need is to provide material inducements for progress in litigation and effec-
tive sanctions for delay even if the latter be of such a character that they may be
regarded by those apprehensive, by reason of their own frailty, of incurring them
as swingeing and draconian.
Supra note 21, at 94, para. 322.
84 Friedman and Macaulay, Law and the Behavioural Sciences (2d ed. N.Y.: Bobbs-
Merrill, 1977) at 190.
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Yet, paradoxically, it is true that the reliance on bargaining provides each
party with the best opportunity to achieve a reasonable settlement and avoid
the all-or-nothing nature of the formal adjudicative process."' Also, bargain-
ing offers a means by which to ensure that the individuality of each case and
its solution is preserved, and to deal effectively with a plethora of legal dis-
putes. Nevertheless, so long as the legal process is obliged to translate legal
rights into quantifiable monetary terms, it is less than realistic to ignore or
underestimate the economic underpinnings of the civil justice system.
Notwithstanding the powerful economic forces at work, the legal pro-
cess ought not to neglect the distributional and equitable implications that
flow from litigation.8" An exclusive concern with the economic consequences
of litigation not only distorts the operation of the legal process, but has a
profoundly negative impact upon the general prospects for the legal system
at large. It is far from clear that individuals evaluate different legal outcomes
purely in terms of their conformity with the dictates of "wealth maximiza-
85 See text accompanying notes 40-43, supra. An attempt to characterize the litiga-
tion process as an overt economic activity was made by the Winn Committee:
... negotiation as well as the litigation of personal injury claims is today an
industry. We think that commercial, i.e., monetary, considerations should play a
greater part in the conduct of these industries and that it should be made costly
for defendants or their insurers to postpone the settlement of claims or for plain-
tiffs to delay their presentation or negotiation. It is a feature of industry and
commerce that outstanding liabilities incur added interest whereas prompt pay-
ments earn a discount.
Supra note 21, at 94, para. 323.
86 The currently favoured "law and economics" movement, as pioneered and cham-
pioned by Posner, has come under heavy attack for its failure to tackle adequately the
distributional consequences of different allocations of resources. His critics maintain
that the initial distribution of resources will determine what is an optimal allocation of
resources and, without a theory or explanation of the initial distribution, the value of the
economic analysis of law collapses: see, inter alia, Baker, The Ideology of the Economic
Analysis of Law (1975), 5 Phil. & Pub. Affs. 3, Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value? (1980),
9 J. Leg. St. 191, Kronman, Wealth Maximisation as a Normative Principle (1980), 9
J. Leg. St. 227 and Weinrib, Utilitarianism, Economics and Legal Theory (1980), 30 U.
Tor. L.J. 307. This point is concisely made by Professor Ogus:
mhe notion of "optimality" which is identified by the maximisation of aggregate
social welfare with no concern at all for how that welfare is distributed within
society involves utilitarian values which many would argue are incompatible with
current notions of social justice. In short, efficient solutions are not always just
solutions. The policy maker is not only concerned with the optimal allocation of
resources but also with the appropriate distribution of resources as determined by
moral and political criteria; he must have regard to the effects on income and
wealth of a particular decision on allocation.
Economics, Liberty and the Common Law (1980), 15 J.S.P.T.L. 42 at 53. Posner has
made a stirring reply to his critics and, although effecting a fundamental shift in his
philosophical standpoint, has offered a sustained and elaborate defence of the ethical
attractions of the "wealth maximization" criterion: see Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics
and Legal Theory (1979), 8 J. Leg. St. 109, The Value of Wealth (1980), 9 J. Leg.
St. 243 and The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Lav
Adjudication (1980), 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 487. For a convincing refutation of Posner's
claims, see Veljanovski, Wealth Maximisation, Law and Ethics-On the Limits of Eco-
nomic Efficiency (1981), 1 Int. Rev. L. and Econ. 1.
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tion;' 87 an entirely different preference structure may be in operation in
ranking legal and social states as opposed to overt market transactions.8 As
Tawney observed:
Economic efficiency is a necessary element in the life of any sane and vigorous
society, and only the incorrigible sentimentalist will depreciate its significance.
But to convert efficiency from an instrument into a primary object is to destroy
efficiency itself.89
The settlement of a dispute involves much more than a simple termination
of that dispute. In so far as the legal process contributes to that settlement,
it has a responsibility to ensure that the terms are fair and proper.90
While rules and procedures must exist to reduce cost and delay, they
ought not to be permitted to do so in disregard of the merits and reasonable-
ness of settlement. To so do would be to create injustice in the attempt to
remove injustice. The courts should not exist as an instrument of discipline, 9'
they ought "to provide guide-lines, not trip-wires, and they fulfil their func-
tion where they intrude least in the course of litigation. '92 In short, the civil
justice system must not allow an inequitable settlement to become less bur-
densome than the cost of justice.93 A concern for the merits and reasonable-
ness of a settlement is not unknown to the civil justice system. Apart from
a general supervisory jurisdiction over all agreements, 94 the courts take an
active role in proceedings involving persons under disability, such as minors
or mental incompetents. In most jurisdictions, any settlement made by or on
behalf of such a person will not be binding without the approval of the court.
While an extension of this procedure to all settlements is unwarranted both
in practice and in principle, a greater interest in the compromises involving
disadvantaged individuals seems required.
87 In crude terms, it is a simple criterion by which to evaluate the justness and
morality of social and legal institutions and practices purely in terms of their capacity
to increase the wealth of society as measured in monetary terms: see Posner, Utilitar-
ianism, Economics and Legal Theory, id.
88 See Chapman, Law, Morality and the Logic of Choice: An Economist's View
(1979), 29 U. Tor. L.J. 114 and Veljanovski, supra note 86, at 8-9.
89 Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism (London: Penguin Books, 1926)
at 252. In an ironic vein, it has been observed that, in capitalistic terms, the civil
justice system is an overwhelming success, for the product far exceeds the supply: see
Hufstedler, supra note 46, at 754.
90 See Phillips and Hawkins, supra note 50, at 499 and, generally, supra note 86.
9ltCropper v. Smith (1884), 26 Ch. D. 700 at 710, 51 L.T. 729 of 733, 33 W.R.
60 at 62 (C.A.).
92 Master Jacob, "Note of Reservation" in The Report of the Committee on Per-
sonal Injuries Litigation, supra note 21, at 152, para. 2.
93 See Kaufman, supra note 25, at 4. This point, of course, has been forcefully
made before. For instance as early as 1896:
Justice, to be sure, is like any other commodity in that it costs to produce it, but
when the cost of justice is more than the man who needs it can afford to pay, or
more than it is worth to him ... it is intolerable that he should be forced to go
without it.
Note, Who Should Pay Costs? (1896-97), 10 Harv. L. Rev. 242 at 243.
94 See text accompanying notes 136-45, infra.
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B. Legal Standards
In conjunction with the costs rules, one of the most direct contributions
the courts make to the increased informal settlement of disputes is in the
creation and clarification of substantive legal rules and standards.9 5 It has
long been recognized that the more unsettled and unclear the law is, the
greater the likelihood will be that the dispute will fail to be settled without
litigation.9 6 A necessary condition for litigation, therefore, is uncertainty in
regard to law, for this will result in the parties making different assessments
of their own and the other party's chances of success which, in turn, will
create a greater disparity between the amounts at which each party is pre-
pared to litigate.9 7 Moreover, the court's attitude to precedent will be espe-
cially important. The rigour with which the courts are prepared to apply
existing rules of law, or the ease with which they are willing to ignore or
overrule established rules of law will have a definite effect upon the certainty
of the law and, therefore, the volume of litigation. Consequently, the greater
adherence to precedent by English courts than by American courts provides,
at least, a partial explanation of the higher litigation rates in America. 98
Although these conclusions are universally and traditionally accepted,
some of their implications have not been grasped or fully explored. 9 It fol-
lows that the substantive content of the common law is a direct function of
the parties' decision to litigate or settle and the development of the common
law is constrained by that decision. That decision is itself determined by the
content of the common law. Likewise, the best evidence of the existence of
clear and established precedential authority is the absence of litigation. Those
disputes that are litigated and adjudicated upon are those in which, for some
reason, the force of precedent is weak or problematic. 0 It has been argued,
therefore, that the legal community is wrong to direct its search for the
substantive content of the common law at the appellate stage of dispute
95 This includes not only their common law power, but also their jurisdiction to
interpret and enforce statutory enactments and administrative regulations.
96 Mill, Principles of Political Economy (1848), bk. 5, ch. 8, §3.
97 See text accompanying note 59, supra.
98 See text accompanying note 21, supra. For a fuller explanation of this phenom-
enon, see Landes and Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis
(1976), 19 J. Law & Econ. 249.
99 This neglect has recently been compensated for by a spate of articles seeking to
discuss the selective influence of litigation characteristics: see Rubin, Why is the Com-
mon Law Efficient? (1977), 6 J. Leg. St. 51, Priest, The Common Law Process and the
Selection of Efficient Rules (1977), 6 J. Leg. St. 65 and The Selective Characteristics
of Litigation, supra note 52; Goodman, An Economic Theory of the Evolution of
Common Law (1978), 7 J. Leg. St. 793; Landes and Posner, Adjudication as a Private
Good (1979), 8 J. Leg. St. 235.
100 The attempt to formulate a theory of decision-making to explain and assess
the handling of such "hard cases" lies at the heart of contemporary jurisprudential de-
bate: see Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harv. Univ. Press, 1978) at
1-149 and Jurisprudence Symposium (1977), 11 Ga. L. Rev. 969. For an accessible
account of the manifold way in which a rule can be problematic, see Twining and
Miers, How to do Things with Rules (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977).
19811
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
resolution where, by its very nature, legal rules will be indeterminate or ab-
sent. In order to unearth and articulate the settled and exact substantive
standards of any legal system, attention should be focused on the decisions
of parties as to whether to litigate or not: "from the standpoint of the stand-
ards of decision, the common law will appear relatively indeterminate, but
from the standpoint of the parties' litigation decisions, it will appear con-
sistent and predictable."''1
1
It follows, therefore, that the extant and active body of the common law
rules is to be found not in appellate decisions, but in the settlement process
and the terms on which disputes are compromised. When it is remembered
that the vast majority of disputes are never litigated and that, of those, only
a very small percentage ever reaches the appellate courts, 10 2 the full implica-
tion of these arguments can be appreciated:
The legal rules affect most cases only to the extent that they are reflected in the
process of settlement....
[The] "law" that directly governs the disposition of most tort claims .... consists
in [the settlement practices of disputants].,o 3
Moreover, the other factors that operate on the litigation-settlement decision
become even more important. For instance, costs rules not only operate to
reduce the volume of disputes litigated, but actually have a real impact on
the development of the substantive content of the common law.
104
Finally, it has also been suggested recently that there is a "Darwinian
mechanism" at work within the legal process. Professors Rubin, Priest and
Goodman have sought to demonstrate that all the rules, principles, doctrines
and decisions produced by judges are subject to selective pressure through
litigation. 10 5 In a proposal similar to Hayek's thesis that natural selection
operates among societies and that less efficient societies will succumb to more
efficient ones,10 6 they argue that regardless of the method or criteria by which
rules are originally formulated, only the efficient ones will survive and re-
main. Accordingly, inefficient rules will generate more litigation and less
settlement than efficient rules. 0
7
101 Priest, Selective Characteristics of Litigation, supra note 99, at 421.
1
0 2 See text accompanying note 21, supra.
103 James Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance
(1948), 57 Yale L.J. 549 at 566.
1
0 4 It has been pointed out, however, that the most powerful determinant of the
litigation-settlement decision is the quality and quantum of information available to
each party. Where there is a significant difference in information available to each party,
the value and effect of precedent will be small. Rizzo, Can There Be a Principle of
Explanation in Common Law Decisions? (1980), 9 J. Leg. St. 423.
105 See supra note 99.
'O6 Hayek, "Rules and Orders" in I Law, Legislation and Liberty (Chicago: Univ.
of Chicago Press, 1973) at 18.
1
0 7 This observation and the analytical methodology supporting it have been strong-
ly attacked: see especially, Fried, The Laws of Change: The Cunning of Reason in
Moral and Legal History (1980)., 9 J. Leg. St. 355 and O'Driscoli, Justice, Efficiency,
and The Economic Analysis of Law (1980), 9 J. Leg. St. 355.
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V. THE ENVIRONMENT OF COMPROMISE
Not only does the formal system make a direct contribution to the terms
and frequency of settlements, it also seeks to ensure that an appropriate en-
vironment is cultivated in which the reaching of compromises will be stimu-
lated and enhanced. 08 Most civil justice systems have introduced elaborate
and sophisticated procedures and rules to establish and sustain an environ-
ment that is conducive to informal dispute settlement activity. Some measures
operate supportively so as to allow the parties to negotiate confidentially and
confidently, while other procedural devices impose duties and obligations
upon the parties.10 9 The four major areas of involvement by the formal sys-
tem in the operation of the informal system will be examined briefly.
A. Privileged Communications
The law offers protection to communications aimed at achieving the
settlement of a legal dispute. 110 Where litigation is pending, contemplated or
being actively pursued, all forms of negotiation carried out in a bona fide
manner are accorded a privileged status;"' they may not be referred to at
trial or ordered to be disclosed on discovery. The privilege is designed to
encourage a full, frank exchange of views without fear that any concession
or gesture may later be interpreted as an admission of liability or quantum
of damages. As Chief Justice Dixon stated in the High Court of Australia:
The law relating to communications without prejudice is of course familiar. As a
matter of policy the law has long excluded from evidence admissions by words
or conduct made by parties in the course of negotiations to settle litigation. The
purpose is to enable parties engaged in an attempt to compromise litigation to
compromise with one another freely and without the embarrassment which 'the
liability of their communications to be put in evidence subsequently might impose
upon them. The law relieves them of this embarrassment so that their negotiation
to avoid litigation or to settle it may go on unhampered. 1 2
Although the stated policy of the law "is in favour of enlarging the cloak
under which negotiations may be conducted without prejudice," 11, there is a
'
0 8 See Lempert, Moral Tales of Two Courts: Exploring Changes in The "Dispute
Settlement Function" of Trial Courts (1978), 13 Law & Soc. Rev. 91 at 97-100.
'
0 9 For an empirical evaluation of the extent to which courts actively and effectively
intervene to resolve disputes, see Friedman and Percival, A Tale of Two Courts: Litiga-
tion in Alameda and San Benito Counties (1976), 10 Law & Soc. Rev. 267.
110 La Roche v. Armstrong, [1922] 1 K.B. 485 at 489, [1922] All E.R. 311 at 312,
126 L.T. 699 at 700, per Lush J.
" There is no magic in attaching the words "without prejudice" to communica-
tions. It is the intention of the parties, as indicated by the surrounding circumstances,
that is paramount: Paddock v. Forrester (1842), 3 Man. & G. 903, 3 Scot. N.R. 715,
133 E.R. 1404 and Oliver v. Nautilus Steam Shipping Co. Ltd., [1903] 2 K.B. 639, 52
W.R. 200, 19 T.L.R. 607 (A.C.).
112 Field v. Commissioner for Railways for New South Wales (1957), 99 C.L.R.
285 at 289, 32 A.L.J.R. 110 at 112, [1958] A.L.R. (C.N.) 1055 (H.C.).
113 Cross, Evidence (5th ed. London: Butterworths, 1979) at 300. For a modern
survey of the various rules governing the non-disclosure of evidence in Canada, see
Williams, Discovery of Civil Litigation Trial Preparation in Canada (1980), 58 Can.
Bar Rev. 1.
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slight limit on the availability of the privilege. Such communications may be
admissible to prove that a compromise was in fact reached and to indicate
the terms of such an agreement.1 4 Also, the privilege will not be available if
the communication contains a threat," 5 or constitutes an unlawful act.""
Whether such correspondence is inadmissible on the question of costs where
undue delay or unreasonableness is alleged remains a moot point."
7
B. Discovery of Information
It is evident that the greater the quantum and quality of available in-
formation, the greater is the likelihood that a dispute will be more fairly and
expeditiously resolved. In order to encourage and facilitate the disclosure of
relevant information, all jurisdictions have introduced rules and procedures
designed to achieve this incontestable objective." 8 Not all jurisdictions, how-
ever, have agreed upon the extent and rigour with which this objective ought
to be pursued. In England the discovery process is confined to documents;" 0
whereas in the United States it extends to the oral examination of any per-
son.120 Between these two extremes lies a number of alternatives.121 Nonethe-
less, the basic philosophy underlying modem discovery procedures is that it
will "render the judicial process more accurate and fair"' 22 and, more im-
portantly in the context of this article, it will enable the parties to "gain a
better understanding of the opposing case, its strengths as well as its weak-
nesses, and thus have a more rational basis.., for deciding whether to
bring the action forward for trial or to compromise.'
23
In spite of the apparent theoretical benefits, actual experience does not
314 Walker v. Wilsher (1889), 23 Q.B.D. 355, 58 L.J.Q.B. 501, 5 T.LR. 649
(C.A.); Tomlin v. Standard Telephones, [1969] 1 W.C.R. 1378, [1969] 3 All E.R. 201.
115Kurtz v. Spence (1887), 57 L.J. Ch. 238, 58 L.T. 438, 5 R.P.C. 161.
t11Re Daintrey, [1893] 2 A.B. 116, [1881-84] All E.R. 209, 69 L.T. 257; Green-
wood v. Fills (1961), 29 D.L.R. (2d) 260 (B.C.C.A.).
117 The older cases of Walker v. Wilsher, supra note 114 and Stotesbury v. Turner,
[1943] K.B. 270, 112 LJ.K.B. 365, 168 L.T. 355 suggest that such evidence can never
be given on the question of costs, but the more recent, although less authorative deci-
sion in Calderbank v. Calderbank, [1976] Far. 93 (C.A.), [1975] 3 W.L.R. 586, [1975]
3 All F.R. 333 (C.A.) goes against this view; see also Murphy, A Practical Approach
to -Evidence (London: Financial Training Pub., 1980) at 296.
118 For an historical account of the development of discovery procedures, see James
and Hazard, supra note 27, at 179-84.
11" R.S.C. (Eng.), Ord. 24. Discovery is further confined to those documents "which
are or have been in the [parties'] possession, custody or power relating to matters in
question in the action;" R.S.C. (Eng.), Ord. 24, r. 1(1). There is no provision for oral
discovery, but, with leave of the court, interrogatories may be made use of; R.S.C. (Eng.),
Ord. 26, r. 1. In limited circumstances, it is possible to obtain discovery against non-
parties; R.S.C. (Eng.), Ord. 24, r. 7A(4).
120 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 30(a).
121 For instance, the new Ontario Rules allow oral examination of certain non-
parties with leave of the court: see Proposed Rules, supra note 78, at 102-17, rr. 32-34.
1= Louisell and Wally, Modern California Discovery (San Francisco: Bancroft-
Whitney, 1972) at 2 and, see generally, Developments in The Law-Discovery (1960-
62), 74 Harv. L. Rev. 940 at 944-46.
1= Williams, supra note 113, at 29.
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wholly support the view that broader discovery and increased information
improve the equity and number of settlements actually reached. Although
those litigants who proceed to trial benefit considerably from evidence ob-
tained on discovery, research has indicated that the increase in available
information has provided some support for both parties and has encouraged
them to proceed to trial rather than to compromise.12 4 While further infor-
mation may persuade "an honest and fair-dealing litigant, on seeing how
strong a case his opponent had,... [to] at once withdraw from further litiga-
tion,"'' 5 the less scrupulous litigant might discover "that his opponent is not
aware of some awkward fact or facts, and he may for that reason be em-
boldened to persevere with an unrighteous claim or defence."' 2 6 Notwith-
standing these possibilities; it remains clear that, as the quality and quantum




Most jurisdictions have created formal occasions on which judges are
able to involve themselves in the settlement process. There is mixed opinion,
however, over the propriety and effectiveness of such judicial intervention.
While some judges contend that the judge has a responsibility to pursue every
legitimate means to achieve settlement,128 others still maintain that "the
dispute is between the parties and the judge merely keeps the ring."'-'
Nonetheless, a variety of procedures exists to allow judges to stimulate and,
occasionally, to initiate, settlement. Historically, the basic vehicle for such
judicial participation has been the "summons for directions" which still re-
mains in many jurisdictions today. This procedure provides an opportunity
for the courts to take stock of the litigation to date and, in theory, to make
such directions for the future conduct of the proceedings "as appear best
adapted to secure the just, expeditious and economical disposal thereof.' 30
Unfortunately, despite its obvious potential, this has become little more than
"an administrative affair"' 31 whose impact on the actual prospects for settle-
124 Glaser, Pre-Trial Discovery and the Adversa-y System (N.Y.: Russell Sage
Foundation, 1968) at 91-116.
125 Re Strachan, [1895] 1 Ch. 439 at 445, 72 L.T. 175 at 177, 43 W.R. 369 at 370
per Lindley L.J. (C.A.).
12( Knapp v. Harvey, [1911] 2 K.B. 725 at 730-31, 80 L.J.K.B. 1228 at 1231, 105
L.T. 473 (C.A.) per Fletcher Moulton L.J.
127 On the economic model, such information will affect the parties' calculation as
to the probabilities of success and, thereby, affect the amount at which they are pre-
pared to settle: see text accompanying notes 54-76, supra.
128 See, for instance, Lacey, The Judge's Role in the Settlement of Disputes (un-
published manuscript, prepared for a seminar for newly appointed judges at the Federal
Judicial Center, 1977).
129 R. v. Harris, [1927] 2 K.B. 587 at 590, 96 L.J.K.B. 1069 at 1070, per Lord
Hewart C.J.
130 R.S.C. (Eng.), Ord. 25, r. 1(1).
131 Wilson, Cases and Materials on the English Legal System (London: Sweet &
Maxwell, 1973) at 343. See generally, Diamond, The Summons for Direction (1959),
75 L.Q.R. 43.
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ment has been minimal. Indeed, it has been criticized as being positively
"useless and wasteful.' 32
As congestion, costs and delay in the courts have increased, some juris-
dictions have experimented with a number of devices. The most popular of
these has been the "pre-trial conference." First introduced into the United
States by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938,'133 it provides a forum
in which the parties, their representatives and a judge can meet. Apart from
providing a formal occasion at which contentious issues can be clarified and
undisputed facts can be agreed upon, it offers a forum at which the parties
and, importantly, the legal system, as represented by the judges, can nego-
tiate in earnest. There has been considerable disagreement, however, about
the utility of such a procedure. Rosenberg has challenged the grass-roots
judicial support and claimed that such a device, far from enhancing the effi-
ciency of the courts, actually reduces its overall effectiveness and exacerbates
the difficulties it was designed to overcome. 34 Nevertheless, there is evidence
to suggest that litigants, who might otherwise be reluctant to explore settle-
ment possibilities for fear of signalling weakness, welcome such judicial in-
volvement." 6r Furthermore, it would not seem to offend the basic character-
istic of "party-autonomy," if judges assisted, but did not coerce, parties in
reaching mutually beneficial and fair compromises.
D. Enforcement of Agreements
The courts and the substantive law provide the vital machinery by and
through which compromises can be effectively enforced and, where necessary,
set aside.136 The essence of any compromise is agreement. Hence, the general
law of contract dictates the terms and conditions under which compromises
giving rise to legal obligations can be validly entered into, performed and
enforced. A valid compromise brings a dispute to a close as effectively as if
132 See Winn Report, supra note 21, at para. 351.
133 For a general discussion of pre-trial conferences in Canada and the United
States, see O.L.R.C., Report on the Administration of Ontario Courts (Toronto: Min.
of the A.G., 1973) Part 3 at 107-25; Wright, The Pre-Trial Conference (1960), 28
Fed. Rules Dees. 141; and Burbury, Modern Pre-Trial Civil Procedure in the U.S.A.
(1965), 2 U. of Tas. L. Rev. 111.
S4 See Rosenberg, The Pre-Trial Conference and Effective Justice (N.Y.: Colum.
Univ. Press, 1965). However, his conclusions have been challenged: see Becker, Effi-
cient Use of Judicial Resources (1967), 43 Fed. Rules Dees. 421, Chantry, Pre-trial-
Utility or Futility (1965), 32 Ins. Co. J. 602 and Todd, Pretrial Revisited (1967), 50
Judicature 153. For an assessment of a project devoted to the effects of the introduc-
tion of pre-trial conferences on the subsequent disposition of civil cases set down for
non-jury trial in Toronto, see Stevenson, Watson and Weissman, The Impact of Pre-
trial Conferences: An Interim Report on the Ontario Pretrial Conference Experiment
(1977), 15 Osgoode Hall L.J. 591.
35 See McKay, Civil Litigation and The Public Interest (unpublished manuscript,
prepared for a U.K.N.C.C.L. Colloquium at Cambridge, England, 1980) at 28.
136 For a general, if in parts superficial, survey of the law governing settlements,
see Foskett, The Law and Practice of Compromise (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1980).
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the dispute had been litigated to the full. 137 In the event of a breach of the
compromise, the usual range of contractual remedies will be available. For
added security, however, the parties may wish to have their private agreement
ratified.by the court, thereby conferring upon it the status of a judgment of
the court itself and making available the various official enforcement devices.
Whichever method is relied upon to finalize an agreement to compromise,
the guarantee of compliance offered by the formal rules and institutions may
give an otherwise reluctant disputant the confidence to settle.
Although it is a well established principle of Anglo-Canadian law that a
person is free to make bad as well as good bargains, the courts are prepared
to intervene in order to relieve the weak and foolish where they are "over-
matched and overreached. ' uaS The common law has always operated to
prevent a contracting party from being enriched by taking advantage of
somebody who was in a state "of poverty .... ignorance... and absence of
independent advice."' 39 The Canadian courts have granted such relief in a
number of cases where injured persons have unwisely agreed to a compro-
mise on disadvantageous terms.' 40 Indeed, in one English case, the judge
went so far as to say that an insurance adjuster is under an obligation to
"make sure he starts ... with what would be a reasonable sum.' 4 1 The pre-
cise ambit of this vitiating factor, however, is extremely difficult to gauge.
Lord Denning has tried to articulate a single principle based on "the in-
equality of bargaining power" that embraces a whole range of situations:
English law gives relief to one who, without independent advice, enters into a
contract upon terms which are very unfair.., for a consideration which is grossly
inadequate, when his bargaining power is grievously impaired by reason of his
own needs or desires, or by his own ignorance or infirmity, coupled with undue
influences or pressures brought to bear on him by or for the benefit of the other.
... The one who stipulates for an unfair advantage may be moved solely by his
own self-interest, unconscious of the distress he is bringing to the other. I have
also avoided any reference to the will of the one being "dominated" or "over-
come" by the other. One who is in extreme need may knowingly consent to a
most improvident bargain, solely to relieve the straits in which he finds himself.142
'37 Knowles v. Roberts (1888), 38 Ch. D. 263 at 272, 58 L.T. 259 at 263 (C.A.)
per Bowen L.J. This applies whether litigation was commenced or not: Cook v. Wright
(1861), 1 B. & S. 559, 30 L.J.Q.B. 321, 4 L.T. 704.
138 Black v. Wilcox (1976), 12 O.R.(2d) 759, 70 D.L.R.(3d) 192.
139 See generally, Waddams, The Law of Contract (Toronto: Canada Law Book,
1977) at 318-20; Fry v. Lane (1888), 40 Ch. D. 312 at 322 per Kay J., quoted and
applied in Morrison v. Coast Finance Ltd. (1965), 55 D.L.R. (2d) 710 at 713
(B.C.C.A.); see also, Wood v. Abrey (1818), 3 Madd. 417 at 423, 56 E.R. 558, per
Leach V.C., Earl of Aylesford v. Morris (1873), L.R. 8 Ch. App. 484, Slater v. Nolan
(1876), 11 1.R. Eq. 367.
140 Towers v. Affleck, [1974] 1 W.W.R. 714, [1974] 1 L.R. 1-599 (B.C.); Pridmore
v. Calvert (1975), 54 D.L.R. (3d) 133 (B.C.S.C.); Doyle v. Diamond Flint Glass Co.
(1904), 8 O.L.R. 499, affd. 10 O.L.R. 567 (C.A.); de Konig v. Boychuk, 2 W.W.R.
251, [1951] 3 D.L.R. 624 (Alta. S.C.).
141 Saunders v. Ford Motor Co. Ltd., [1970] 1 LI. Reps. 379 at 387 per Paull J.
(A.B.D.).
142 Lloyds Bank v. Bundy, [1975] Q.B. 326 at 339, [1974] 3 W.L.R. 501 at 509,
[1974] 2 Ll. Rep. 366 at 370-71 per Lord Denning (C.A.).
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It has been held that the mere presence of independent advice will not of
itself necessarily save an agreement.143 And, duress of an economic nature
will operate to avoid a compromise where it amounts "to a coercion of will,
which vitiates consent."'1 44 Yet mere inequality of bargaining power is in-
sufficient to avoid an agreement; it must lead to bargains in which an im-
moderate gain is made. 45
VI. CONCLUSION
This article has sought to explore the relationship that exists between
the formal and informal schemes of the civil justice system. It should be
apparent that each scheme operates only as a function of the other and any
attempt to evaluate their performance must recognize their mutual depend-
ence. Further, in seeking to detail the dynamics of this symbiosis, a better
understanding of the workings of the whole civil justice system as a unified
and complex whole will emerge. The benefits to be obtained from such a
system are obvious. If the civil justice system is to perform at its optimal
capacity, a more informed and less idealized appreciation of its workings is
a prerequisite. Although a blueprint of detailed proposals for improving the
system is beyond the scope of this initial analysis, it is appropriate to make
some general observations on the more pressing problems within the present
relationship and to indicate the direction and character that one significant
reform might take.
The major lesson to be learned is that, if progress is to be made or
reform is to be successful, the focus of critical attention has to shift from the
formal scheme to the informal scheme. In so far as the informal resolution
of disputes represents the overwhelming part of the civil justice system, it is
this aspect of the dispute-resolution process that must be confronted and
reviewed:
... [A] substantial majority of "serious" cases and the great mass of all cases
[are] terminated without court intervention .... If the handling of the great mass
of... claims is to be improved, it is the adjustment process rather than the
judicial process which will have to change.140
Before there can be any meaningful reform of the civil justice system that
stands any reasonable chance of success, a clearer and more holistic percep-
tion of the informal scheme and its interaction with the formal scheme is
required. Indeed, there is substantial data to show that contemporary courts
and legal procedures are not as efficient or satisfactory dispute-resolvers as
their more informal counterparts in less developed societiesY' 7
143 Backhouse v. Rackhouse, [1978] 1 W.L.R. 243 at 252, [1978] 1 All E.R. 1158 at
1166 per Balcombe I.
144 Pao On v. Lau Yin Long, [1980] A.C. 614 at 636, [1979] 3 W.L.R. 435 at 451,
[1979] 3 All E.R. 65 at 79 (P.C.).
145 Levison v. Patent Steam Carpet Cleaning, [1978] Q.B. 69, [1977] 3 W.L.R. 90,
[1977] 3 All E.R. 498 (C.A.).
146 Conard, supra note 21, at 3-4.
147 Such comparisons, of course, are extremely difficult to make, but the available
research suggests that such a conclusion can be reasonably drawn: see Nader, "Styles
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The pervasive difficulty, of course, is to reconcile the many competing
objectives and conflicting values that run through the civil justice system.
In seeking to embrace procedures that are most productive of justice, the
system must strive to allow the parties the fullest opportunity to present their
case and to facilitate an extensive, impartial investigation of the law and
facts pertaining to the case. At the same time, the system must ensure that all
citizens have equal access to the courts and that cases are disposed of ex-
peditiously and at reasonable expense. The system must strive to strike a
balance that best accommodates and promotes these apparently irreconcilable
demands; "the intended product of the court system is justice of which effi-
ciency, convenience and costs are only constituent parts and do not together
comprise the whole."'148 It must satisfy a broad Kantian calculus that aims
for an optimal state of affairs in which the fullest facilitation of any one
objective is allowed to the extent that it is compatible with the fullest preser-
vation of all the other objectives. Although the present Anglo-Canadian
system is devoted to reaching such a compromise, it falls short of so doing
in a number of areas. It is hoped that this account has exposed the inaccuracy
of Lord Devlin's assessment that "the fallacy inherent in our High Court
procedure of civil litigation is... that where justice is concerned, time and
money are no object."' 49 It is clear that, in some circumstances, 150 the con-
verse is true; the price of justice, combined with the length of its gestation
period, is often beyond the patience and financial resources of the average
citizen.
A feature of the present Anglo-Canadian civil justice system that serves
to increase the hazards of litigation is the all-or-nothing outcome of pro-
ceedings. Further, the existence of costs rules compounds the unsettling effect
of this hazard upon litigants and conditions all the paraphernalia of the law.
If a case proceeds to trial, there must be strong arguments on both sides that
favour a finding one way or the other. In fact, the case may be finely bal-
anced and the outcome may be too close to call. In such circumstances, the
notion of "winner-takes-all" is anathema to the concept of justice between
parties. Moreover, the fact that the formal scheme has developed rules to
stimulate compromises in private settlements militates even further against
the alternatives of polarized outcomes in the formal setting. Although there
are difficulties of implementation, it has been suggested that the judicial pro-
cess should operate from the initial assumption that there will be "equality
of apportionment" unless there are adequate and legitimate grounds for
departing from the original position of equilibrium.1 1 The attraction of such
of Court Procedure: To Make the Balance' in Nader, ed., Law and Culture in Society
(Chicago: Aldine, 1969) at 69; Gibbs, The Kpelle Moot: A Therapeutic Model for the
Informal Settlement of Disputes (1963), 33 Africa 1; Yngvesson and Hennessey, Small
Claims, Complex Disputes: A Review of the Small Claims Literature (1975), 9 Law &
Soc. Rev. 219.
148 O.L.R.C., supra note 133, at 4.
149 Zander, ed., What's Wrong with the Law? (London: British Broadcasting Corp.,
1970) at 76.
150 See text accompanying notes 54-76, supra.
151 See Coons, Compromise as Precise Justice (1980), 68 Cal. L. Rev. 350.
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a proposal is that it respects the reality of "contested cases," in that they will
be finely balanced. It does not provide a powerful disincentive to sue and,
in so far as it universalizes the reasoning behind the notion of "contributory
negligence," it allows for quantified outcomes that represent "just and wise
policy.' 52 Although such a proposal would have a massive impact on the
workload of the formal scheme, it would eradicate in one fell stroke many
of the less acceptable features of the civil justice system. The extra cost to
society at large in financing such a system would be amply set off by the
private gains of those who, at present, must settle for amounts that fall far
short of the objective and just worth of their claims.
In conclusion, therefore, it must be urged that proper attention be given
to the informal scheme of civil justice. Although it is the prerogative of the
formal process to introduce rules and procedures, such devices will by and
large affect the operation of the informal scheme. Any proposal for the reno-
vation of civil procedural law must improve the quality of the whole of the
civil justice system, Law reformers must be constantly aware that the prov-
ince of justice extends far beyond the formal confines of the courts and their
related institutions. In so far as procedure must continually strive to study
and conform to the needs and progress of the times,153 the rule-makers must
ensure that they fully appreciate and understand the operation of the infor-
mal activities and the regime of the civil justice system. Moreover, to the
extent that the law exhorts the judges to construe procedural rules so as "to
secure the just, least expensive and most expeditious determination of every
civil proceeding on its merits,"'' 54 they must keep an eye open for the very
real and influential effect that their decisions will have upon the frequency
and fairness of informal settlements. If the civil justice system is to have a
bright and healthy future, it must respect and attend to the needs and re-
quirements of the informal process of the civil justice system.
152 Id. at 260.
153 See Jacobs, The Reform of Civil Procedural Law (1980), 14 Law Teacher 1
at 1-3.
154 See, for instance, Proposed Rules, supra note 78, at r. 1.03(3).
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